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Abstract Parties face a trade-off between motivating partisans to participate in the election
and appealing to issue-oriented middle-of-the-road voters. We show that, consequently, par-
ties may diverge from the median voters’ preferred policy by sending ambiguous messages
to voters which include announcements of alternative platforms. Moreover, surprisingly, an
increase in the size of a partisan constituency may lead to platform convergence towards
the median voters’ preferred policy. We identify two conditions for this outcome. First, the
electorate is sufficiently divided such that full convergence does not occur and, second, the
majority of the non-partisan voters is more inclined to the party with increased support of
partisans.
Keywords Convergence · Ideology; Median voter · Two-party competition · Voting
JEL Classification D72
1 Introduction
Observed divergence across party platforms challenges the traditional median voter predic-
tions (Downs 1957), that parties and political candidates will tend to cater to the middle-of-
the-road voters. This alludes to the relevance of other factors, such as ideological preferences
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of candidates under probabilistic voting (see e.g., Wittman 1983; Calvert 1985; Alesina
1988; Roemer 1997a; Cukierman and Tommasi 1998a, 1998b), a strategic motive to cater
to partisan constituencies (e.g., Glaeser et al. 2005) and/or the role of special interest groups
(Olson 1982; Grossman and Helpman 1996, 2001; Ashworth 2006) in explaining parties’
behavior.
This paper examines the role of partisanship in shaping policy platforms set by polit-
ical parties. For the United States, empirical evidence suggests that political partisanship
remained fairly stable in the 1980s and 1990s and has been increasing since 2000. Looking
at the feeling of voters towards parties as captured by their responses to the “thermometer”
questions included in the National Election Survey, Kimball and Gross (2007) measure the
extent of partisanship by the correlation between thermometers for the Republican Party
and the Democratic Party. They show that the correlation between party thermometers was
never as strong as it was in 2004 (−0.47).1 Moreover, it is more negative for strong partisans
(−0.7) and campaign activists (−0.6) than for fairly independent voters and non-activists.2
This suggests that party identifiers not only support their own party but also harbor strong
negative feelings towards the other party.3 In addition, the campaign contributions of eco-
nomic elites increasingly are targeted to candidates with strong ideological predispositions
(see McCarty et al. 2006 and the references therein).
Prima facie, one would expect that the existence of stronger (and more cohesive) parti-
san constituencies, or, larger support of special interest groups for candidates with extreme
positions, would lead to greater divergence across party platforms, to the disadvantage of
middle-of-the-road voters. However, this paper argues that stronger partisanship may well
induce convergence of platforms towards the one preferred by the median voter and may
thereby benefit middle-of-the-road voters.
We propose a simple two-party model where parties seek to maximize the (expected)
number of votes. We assume that partisan voters never defect from their own party but
may abstain from voting when the proposed policy platform is sufficiently far from their
ideology.4 We thus provide a microfoundation for the notion that parties/candidates seem, at
least to some extent, to be ideology-driven and argue that this may be consistent with pure
vote-maximization in the face of partisan constituencies. Parties face, hence, a fundamental
trade-off between motivating partisans to participate in the election, on the one hand, and
appealing to non-partisan, middle-of-the-road voters, on the other hand.
Our modeling strategy serves two goals. First, the existence of partisan voters together
with the assumption that parties are motivated by vote share (rather than by the implemented
policies) gives rise, in a simple way, to the possibility that parties diverge from the policy
preferred by the majority of (middle-of-the-road) voters. Second, the proposed framework
enables us to shed light on the question whether and under which circumstances more rabid
partisanship (a larger fraction of party identifiers in the electorate) may lead to convergence
of policy platforms.
1In the mid-1970s, by contrast, the correlation coefficient was around zero.
2Glaeser and Ward (2006: Fig. 4) measure partisanship by looking at the difference rather than the correlation
between the feeling towards the Democratic party and the Republican party. They obtain similar results.
3The finding is consistent with social identification theory (Campbell et al. 1960; Greene 2004), according to
which strong partisans suffer from perceptional biases in evaluating their preferred party relative to others.
4In fact, empirically, abstention in elections is strongly determined by alienation, i.e., is a function of the
distance from a voter’s ideal point to the nearest candidate. Such evidence has been found for both presidential
elections (Zipp 1985; Adams and Merrill 2003) and midterm elections (Plane and Gershtenson 2004).
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In our framework, a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist if the middle-of-the-road elec-
torate is sufficiently diverse. This raises a question about the interpretation of a mixed strat-
egy political equilibrium. We follow the approach of Laslier (2000) and interpret a mixed
strategy profile in a deterministic two-party game as reflecting the parties’ proposed plat-
forms, where the probability that a policy alternative is offered equals the fraction of voters
identifying a party with this policy alternative. For instance, one may imagine that the mixed
strategy profile reflects the fractions of time a party announces alternatives. In this sense, we
show that in our setting “ambiguity is a rational behavior for the parties” (Laslier 2000).5 In
this context, where parties can send ambiguous messages to voters, we naturally define con-
vergence (divergence) of party platforms as a higher (lower) fraction of voters who identify
both parties with the policy alternative preferred by the median voter.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. The coming section discusses
related literature. In Sect. 3, we present the basic structure of the model and discuss its as-
sumptions. In Sect. 4 we characterize the political equilibrium. In Sect. 5 we examine the
implications of increased partisanship for the parties’ platform proposals. Section 6 con-
cludes. All formal analysis and derivations are relegated to the appendix.
2 Related literature
As pointed out by Roemer (1997a: 479f.), “[t]he assumptions of ideological parties and un-
certainty together enable us to overcome the tyranny of the median voter theorem” (see also
Persson and Tabellini 2000: ch. 5).6 Unlike many previous contributions, our framework
does not derive divergence of party platforms by adopting the standard probabilistic voting
model (where the election outcome is assumed to be uncertain for given policy alterna-
tives proposed by parties). Rather, we offer a setting, which extends the approach of Laslier
(2000), by allowing for partisan voters. It generates divergence in the sense, that in equi-
librium, not all voters identify a party with the policy alternative preferred by the median
voter. Notably, in our setting, the extent of partisanship is a simple and observable measure
(number of partisans) which can be used to conduct comparative-static analysis.
Eyster and Kittsteiner (2007) propose a different argument why policy platforms di-
verge from the one preferred by the median voter. They show that divergence may oc-
cur when campaign costs are sufficiently high in order to mitigate political competition.
Another interesting source of divergence of parties’ platforms is non-policy related va-
lence competition (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2009; Zakharov 2009). Ashworth and
Bueno de Mesquita (2009) show in a model where candidates can invest in their reputations
(‘charisma’), that a higher valence advantage of a candidate over his/her opponent has a
smaller impact on the fraction of voters the candidate attracts, the more distant platforms
are from each other. Zakharov (2009) explains in a similar framework why party polariza-
tion and campaign spending have simultaneously risen in the United States. In both papers,
5Alesina and Cukierman (1990) study a different kind of policy ambiguity. In their model, there is a stochastic
relationship between the policy instrument of a party and the policy outcome, where the variance of the sto-
chastic element is treated as measure of ambiguity. In our model, ambiguity means that different alternatives
are proposed by the same party.
6Roemer (1997a) endogenizes uncertainty by employing a probabilistic voting framework (e.g., Wittman
1983; Calvert 1985). In his model, the probability of winning an election given the policy platforms set by
(two) parties becomes endogenous when parties are uncertain about the distribution of traits among voters
who turn out in the election.
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divergence softens costly valence competition and may thus occur even in the absence of
policy preferences of parties/candidates.7 Miller and Schofield (2003) and Schofield (2003)
consider both elements, namely, valence competition and campaign contributions. They pro-
pose a model where candidates are pure vote-maximizers who cater to potential activists in
order to elicit campaign contributions. Campaign contributions, in turn, affect valence. As a
result, again, “candidates do not converge in a Downsian fashion to the center of the electoral
distribution. Instead, a ‘rational’ candidate will choose a policy position so as to ‘balance’
off activist contributions and voter responses” (Miller and Schofield 2003: 253).
Most related to our paper, Glaeser et al. (2005) analyze a two-party game where diver-
gence of policy platforms from that preferred by the median voter occurs if and only if “party
affiliates” (holding on average more extreme bliss points than the average bliss point of the
total population) are on average better informed about the platform proposed by a party than
the average voter.8 The extent of extremism (measured by the deviation from the bliss point
preferred by the median voter) of vote-maximizing parties rises if the share of party affiliates
rises. While this is a potential outcome also in our framework, we demonstrate that the result
does not hold true in general and are able to come up with intuitive and testable conditions
under which convergence (or divergence) occurs. Note that in our framework divergence
does not stem from informational asymmetries.
3 Basic structure of the model
Consider an economy with two vote-maximizing political parties, called leftwing (L) and
rightwing (R) party, and a one-dimensional, non-empty set of policy alternatives, P . For
technical reasons, to ensure existence of an equilibrium, suppose that P contains a finite
(but possibly large) number of elements, where P¯L and P¯R denote the leftmost and rightmost
policy of P , respectively.
There is a unit mass of “middle-of-the-road” (i.e., non-partisan) voters. They differ in
their preferences regarding the policy alternatives in P . To capture this heterogeneity in a
simple form, we assume that there are two types of individuals, indexed by i = 1,2, where
the fraction of type i voters is denoted by xi . We assume that x1 ∈ [a, b], 0 < a < b < 1.
Thus, there is a strictly positive proportion of each type of voter. The preferences of voters
of type i are represented by a single-peaked utility function ui(P ). We let P ∗i ≡ arg maxP∈P
ui(P ) denote type-i voters’ preferred policy. We assume that P¯L < P ∗2 < P ∗1 < P¯R ; that is,
voters’ preferred policy varies across types and is in the interior of the policy space. We
further assume that when middle-of-the-road voters of a given type are indifferent between
the policy proposals of the two parties, they split their votes evenly between the two parties.
Finally, we assume that all non-partisan voters take part in the elections.
In addition to middle-of-the-road voters, there exists a mass nL (nR) of individuals, who
identify themselves with the leftwing and rightwing party, respectively, and whose pre-
ferred policy (ideology) is the leftmost (rightmost) element of the policy space (P¯L and P¯R).
Diehard leftists never vote for party R and, similarly, diehard rightists never vote for party
7In general, valence differences affect platform choices (e.g. Groseclose 2001; Aragones and Palfrey 2002).
We will further relate the insights of our paper to this literature, when we discuss our results in the concluding
section.
8See also Carrillo and Castanheira (2008) for the role of imperfect information of voters on convergence
of parties’ platforms. In their model, candidates can invest in the quality of the platform (e.g., by selecting
competent advisers), in addition to selecting policy.
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L.9 We define an increase in the partisan support for party j by an increase in the size of
its diehard constituency (relative to that of middle-of-the-road voting population, which is
normalized to one). That is, the parameters nL and nR measure the extent of partisanship.
These two parameters play a key role in the comparative-static analysis in Sect. 5.10
Diehards of party j = L,R derive intrinsic utility
γ − |Pj − P¯j | (1)
from voting for party j . The (reservation) utility from not participating in the election is
normalized to zero. Thus, partisans vote for the party they feel affiliated with if its proposed
policy is not too distant from their preferred policy; that is, partisans of party j participate
in the election if γ ≥ |Pj − P¯j |. We assume that there is within-group heterogeneity among
the partisans. Formally, we let Fj (γ ) denote the cumulative distribution function of γ for
diehards of party j = L,R. We assume that Fj is continuously differentiable.11
As parties maximize the number of votes, the payoff of party j = L,R is given by
[1 − Fj (|Pj − P¯j |)]nj + Nj, (2)
where Nj denotes the number of middle-of-the-road voters that cast their ballot for party
j = L,R. The first term of (2) captures party j ’s loss of partisan votes associated with
deviating from its ideal point P¯j .
Similar to Glaeser et al. (2005), our model captures the notion that parties must balance
two conflicting goals associated with different types of voters. First, parties compete for
the support of middle-of-the-road voters, who choose between the two parties. Second, par-
ties try to gain support from their diehard constituencies, viewed as a zero-one decision of
diehards, whether to vote or not. In other words, parties face a trade-off between attracting
electoral support from non-partisan voters and catering to their core constituency in order
to induce them to vote. We assume that the diehard constituencies are sufficiently similar in
size or, alternatively, that nL and nR are sufficiently small, such that the median voter will
be a member of the middle-of-the-road constituency. The preferences of both parties and
voters are assumed to be common knowledge.
Two remarks are in order. First, the assumption of vote-maximizing parties implies that
parties neither care about the implemented policy nor about winning the election per se
(like in Roemer 1997b; Dixit and Londregan 1998; Glaeser et al. 2005, among others).
It captures the notion of career-driven politicians in its sharpest relief and is particularly
reasonable for parliamentary elections, i.e., when the seats in parliament depend on vote
share. Accordingly, a larger number of parliament members affiliated with a party may be
eligible for certain ‘perks’ or privileges. Also, some decisions in parliament may require a
supermajority. Moreover, as pointed out by Glaeser et al. (2005, p. 1294), vote-maximization
is equivalent to the assumption that parties are “maximizing the probability of victory if, for
9For instance, see Shachar (2003), who stresses that partisanship involves habit formation from voting. Em-
pirical evidence also suggests a close relationship between the ideological dispositions of voters and party
identification (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Schreckhise and Shields 2003).
10These simple measures have the advantage that there are readily observable and therefore could be used for
hypotheses testing. They could, for instance, be derived from “thermometer” surveys like those conducted by
the US National Election Survey.
11Although Fj is defined on a finite grid, assuming continuity ensures that there are no jumps in the number
of supporting partisans when party j ’s platform changes, no matter how fine the policy grid is.
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example, each party’s vote totals were affected by exogenous shocks whose difference is
uniformly distributed”.
Second, parties’ payoff (2) resembles a standard (reduced-form) objective function of
parties which consists of an ideological component of policy-motivated parties/candidates
and of an egorent associated with success in the election. Parameter nj then measures the
relative importance of these objectives for party j . What our microfoundation shows is
that seemingly ideologically driven behavior of parties may not be inconsistent with par-
ties/candidates which are purely power-driven, but reflects the importance for parties to mo-
bilize partisans to participate in the election. Apart from our microfoundation, it is also
conceivable to motivate the payoff function in (2) as reflecting the potential withdrawal of
financial campaign contributions by partisans. That is, similar to the turnout decision cap-
tured in our framework, partisans could make their financial contributions dependent on
platform announcements and these contributions would enter the parties’ payoffs. Again,
parties would have to resolve the trade-off between appealing to partisans, thereby raising
more funds by setting the platform close to the partisans’ bliss points, and gaining the sup-
port of middle-of-the-road voters (power hunger).12
As will become apparent, there does not always exist a pure-strategy equilibrium for our
two-party game. For interpreting mixed-strategy profiles, we follow the notion of Laslier
(2000) that parties may send ambiguous messages about the policy alternative they want to
implement. To capture this ambiguity in policy choices, consider a mixed strategy profile
in the political game denoted by , which is characterized by the two parties L and R, the
payoff functions in (2), and action sets being given by the set of policy alternatives, P . Let
l(PL) denote the probability assigned to policy PL ∈ P by party L, in the mixed strategy
profile of game Γ , whereas r(PR) denotes the probability assigned to policy PR ∈ P by
party R. A pair of platforms is a pair of probability distributions over P , (l, r). For instance,
l(PL) may be interpreted as the fraction of time that party L spends claiming to be in favor
of an alternative PL. For notational convenience, let us also define the sets
Ai = {(PL,PR) : ui(PL) > ui(PR)}, Bi = {(PL,PR) : ui(PL) = ui(PR)}, (3)
i = 1,2. From the preferences of voters, if all voters identified party L with PL and party R
with PR , the payoff for party L would be given by
πL(PL,PR) = [1 − FL(|PL − P¯L|)]nL +
2∑
i=1
[xi1Ai (PL,PR) + 0.5xi1Bi (PL,PR)], (4)
where 1Ai and 1Bi denote the indicator function for the sets Ai and Bi , respectively.13
A payoff for party R in case of unambiguous voter identification of parties’ proposals,
πR(PL,PR), can be derived analogously.
Following Laslier (2000), suppose that each voter observes a single pair of proposals,
(PL,PR), one of each party, which is randomly and independently drawn from the joint
distribution of proposals (the pair of ambiguous platforms). For any voter, the probability
12Herrera et al. (2008) analyze a framework wherein campaign financing can be used to mobilize party
sympathizers to vote. In Miller and Schofield (2003), voters are non-partisans but may become party activists
who make campaign contributions after policy shifts in a second policy dimension.
13For instance, for a given pair of alternatives, (PL,PR), we have 1Ai (PL,PR) = 1 if ui(PL) > ui(PR) and
zero otherwise. Also recall that if voters of a certain type derive the same utility from the policy alternatives
offered by the two parties, half of them vote for party L and half for party R.
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that he/she identifies party L with PL is l(PL) and the probability that he/she identifies
party R with PR is r(PR). Therefore, due to the law of large numbers, the proportion of
voters (including diehards), who identify party L with PL ∈ P and party R with PR ∈ P is
l(PL)r(PR). This implies that the payoff (number of votes) for party L is given by
∑
PL∈P,PR∈P
l(PL)r(PR)πL(PL,PR). (5)
Importantly, (5) equals the expected payoff, E(πL(PL,PR)), for party L under the pair of
platforms (l, r). In the following we derive the equilibrium of the (deterministic) two-party
game Γ with payoff functions πL(PL,PR) and πR(PL,PR) for party L and R. Because the
proportion of voters who identify a party with a certain alternative is reflected by the mixed
strategy profile of this game, we can interpret the equilibrium mixed strategy profile of Γ
as platforms reflecting ambiguity in the messages sent by parties to voters, when parties
maximize their vote-share.
4 Equilibrium analysis
For the equilibrium analysis of game Γ , we will add another piece of notation and define
P maxi (P ) ≡ max(P ′ ∈ P|ui(P ′) ≥ ui(P )), (6)
and
P mini (P ) ≡ min(P ′ ∈ P|ui(P ′) ≥ ui(P )), (7)
i = 1,2, as the rightmost and leftmost policy alternatives such that utility of voters is at least
as high as that associated with a given platform P .14
We will focus our analysis on the case where the sizes of the diehard constituencies, nL
and nR for party L and R are not too large. Formally, we make the following assumption:
Assumption A1 FL(P ∗i − P¯L)nL ≤ 0.5 and FR(P¯R − P ∗i )nR ≤ 0.5, i = 1,2, simultane-
ously hold.
The assumption rules out pure strategy equilibria in which both parties diverge to their
partisans’ respective ideal points. The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium
for the political game.
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption A1 holds. Then there exists a sufficiently fine policy
grid, P , which contains at least four policy elements (P ∗1 , P ∗2 , P¯L and P¯R), such that:
(i) If x1 ≥ 0.5 + [FL(P ∗1 − P¯L) − FL(P min2 (P ∗1 ) − P¯L)]nL ≡ x¯(nL, P¯L,P ∗1 ), then there is
a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the game Γ such that PL = PR = P ∗1 ,
i.e., parties unambiguously cater to the median voter which is of type 1.
(ii) If x1 ≤ 0.5 − [FR(P¯R − P ∗2 ) − FR(P¯R − P max1 (P ∗2 ))]nR ≡ x(nR, P¯R,P ∗2 ), then parties
unambiguously cater to the median voter which is of type 2.
14Note from the single-peakedness of ui and (7) that P mini (P ) = P for all P ≤ P ∗i and, similarly,
P max
i
(P ) = P for all P ≥ P ∗
i
, according to (6), i = 1,2.
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(iii) If x1 ∈ (x(nR, P¯R,P ∗2 ), x¯(nL, P¯L,P ∗1 )), then game Γ only possesses Nash equilibria in
mixed strategies, i.e., both parties send ambiguous messages to voters.
Proof See Appendix A. 
Assuming that the policy grid is sufficiently fine, Proposition 1 characterizes how the
political equilibrium depends on the distribution of voter types. First, it implies that when
type i voters form a sufficient majority of the middle-of-the-road constituency, then both
parties unambiguously signal the same policy alternative P ∗i , which is the preferred policy
from the point of view of the median voter. One way to interpret this result is that both
parties will cater to the middle on the issue at stake when there is enough cohesion among
voters (captured by a large xi in the case where xi > 0.5). Due to the existence of partisan
voters, however, when one group of voter types forms only a small majority (that is, the
middle-of-the-road electorate is sufficiently divided), full convergence of policy platforms
to the median voter’s ideal point fails. To gain insight, consider, for instance, a situation in
which type 2 voters constitute slightly less than 50% of the electorate and both parties un-
ambiguously propose P ∗1 (thus catering to type 1 voters who form the majority). Thus, each
party will attract one half of the middle-of-the-road electorate. Now consider, say, a leftward
deviation of party L to some (unambiguously proposed) alternative PL > P min2 (P ∗1 ). In such
a case, party L will lose all type 1 voters but at the same time will attract all type 2 voters.
Since the number of type 2 voters is sufficiently close to 0.5, the loss of voters will be rather
small as party L still attracts roughly half of the voters. On the other hand, party L gains
utility through increased turnout of its diehard constituency by shifting its platform leftward.
Hence, such a deviation will be profitable, rendering an equilibrium (P ∗1 ,P ∗1 ) impossible,
although type 1 voters form the majority. Proposition 1 states that in such a case any Nash
equilibrium of the political game necessarily involves mixed strategies, which according to
our setup means that at least one party sends an ambiguous message. This occurs if there is
insufficient consensus among middle-of-the-road voters.
The attempt of parties to balance catering to diehards and appealing to middle-of-the-
road voters implies that within the interval (x, x¯), formally defined by Proposition 1, parties
choose to diverge, in the sense that the policy alternative most preferred by the median voter
is not unambiguously proposed by the two parties in the equilibrium of the political game,
hence the median voter theorem does not apply. Notably, a rise in either nL or nR , capturing
the relative importance of partisans, would (plausibly) enlarge the range in which equilib-
rium necessarily involves mixed strategies, by increasing (decreasing) the upper (lower)
bound of the interval. The finite policy grid, P , ensures the existence of an equilibrium.
The proposition states that the equilibrium necessarily entails parties sending ambiguous
messages, hence diverging, when x1 ∈ (x, x¯). However, one may not conclude that there
generically exists a unique (mixed strategy) equilibrium, which is crucial for conducting
comparative static analysis. For this reason and in order to obtain some easily interpretable
results, in the analysis that follows we will put some more structure on the model by impos-
ing some additional restrictions.
5 Effects of increased partisanship
When the distribution of voter types is such that the political equilibrium initially implies
full convergence of platforms to the preferred policy of the median voter (say x1 ≥ x¯, which
implies that both parties unambiguously propose P ∗1 ) stronger partisanship (say, in favor of
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party L) may imply that x1 will shift inside the interval (x, x¯). This would unambiguously
be harmful for the majority of middle-of-the-road voters (type 1) and may even lead to a
decrease in the well-being of type 2 voters. However, the more interesting (and empirically
relevant) scenario is where, to begin with, platforms do not converge (that is, x1 ∈ (x, x¯)).
In this section, we examine the impact of greater partisanship, captured by an increase in nL
or nR , on the parties’ platforms. We will use the following intuitive notion of convergence
of parties to (and divergence from) the median voter’s preferred policy.
Definition 1 (Convergence to the median voter) Parties are said to converge to (diverge
from) the median voter’s ideal point if, in equilibrium, the fraction of voters who identify
both parties with the policy alternative preferred by the median voter rises (falls).
We choose a simple environment which satisfies the equilibrium properties stated by
Proposition 1 and leads to a unique equilibrium. Uniqueness of equilibrium does not hold
true in general if x1 ∈ (x, x¯) but is needed for a meaningful comparative-static analysis.
Rather than coming up with a general characterization, the goal of this section is to demon-
strate, by employing a simple example, that, somewhat surprisingly, increased partisanship
may well lead to convergence to the median voter’s ideal point (in the sense defined above),
and hence, can benefit the median voter. The example will also allow us to identify read-
ily interpretable (testable) conditions under which platforms tend to converge or diverge. A
discussion of the strategic considerations involved will be taken up later. The example is
specified by Assumption A2:
Assumption A2 The following structure applies:
(i) a = 1/4, b = 3/4,
(ii) P = {P ∗1 ,P ∗2 , P¯L, P¯R},
(iii) nj ∈ (1/3,2/3), j = L,R,
(iv) FL(P ∗2 − P¯L) = FR(P¯R − P ∗1 ) = 1/2, FL(P ∗1 − P¯L) = FR(P¯R − P ∗2 ) = 3/4,
FL(P¯R − P¯L) = FR(P¯R − P¯L) = 1,
(v) u1(P ∗1 ) > u1(P ∗2 ) = u1(P¯R) > u1(P¯L), u2(P ∗2 ) > u2(P ∗1 ) = u2(P¯L) > u2(P¯R).
Assumption A2 imposes a symmetric structure (but abstains from imposing nL = nR),
in which the policy grid, P , comprises the minimal number of elements (part (ii) of A2).
From part (v) of A2 (which specifies voters’ preferences), it follows that P min2 (P ∗1 ) = P¯L
and P max1 (P ∗2 ) = P¯R . Together with part (iv) of A2 and the definitions given in Proposition 1
this implies that x¯ = 1/2 + 3nL/4 and x = 1/2 − 3nR/4. It is straightforward to verify that
under part (iii) of Assumption A2, x¯ > 7/8 and x < 1/8, so that combined with part (i) of
Assumption A2 we have [a, b] ⊂ (x, x¯). Moreover, one can verify from parts (iii) and (iv)
of Assumption A2 on the ideological motives of parties that Assumption A1 holds.
Table 1 gives us, for a given x1, the payoff matrix for the political game Γ under ac-
tion sets P for the two parties and payoff πL for party L as given by (4) and πR for party
R which can be derived by symmetric considerations. As a guide for interpreting the ta-
ble, consider the case where both parties propose policy P ∗1 . In such a case voters split
evenly between the two parties. As P ∗1 differs from the partisans’ ideal points, the losses of
diehard voters experienced by party L and party R are given by FL(P ∗1 − P¯L)nL = 3nL/4
and FR(P¯R − P ∗1 )nR = nR/2, respectively. Thus, the payoff for party L (R) is given by
nL/4 + 1/2 (nR/2 + 1/2, respectively). As can be straightforwardly verified from Table 1,
there exists no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the game Γ . This is consistent with
part (iii) of Proposition 1, as Assumption A2 implies that [a, b] ⊂ (x, x¯).
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Table 1 Payoff matrix for the example
R
L P ∗1 P ∗2 P¯R P¯L
P ∗1
nL
4 + 12 , nR2 + 12 nL4 + x1, nR4 + 1 − x1 nL4 + 1, nR nL4 + 1+x12 , 1−x12
P ∗2
nL
2 + 1 − x1, nR2 + x1 nL2 + 12 , nR4 + 12 nL2 + 1 − x12 , nR + x12 nL2 + 1,0
P¯R 0,
nR
2 + 1 x12 , nR4 + 1 − x12 12 , nR + 12 x1,1 − x1
P¯L nL + 1−x12 , nR2 + 1+x12 nL, nR4 + 1 nL + 1 − x1, nR + x1 nL2 + 12 , 12
5.1 Positive analysis
Equilibrium in mixed strategies of the deterministic two-party game Γ means that parties’
platforms reflect ambiguity in the sense that parties choose to propose more than one policy
alternative to voters and the proportions of voters which identify a party with a certain al-
ternative corresponds to the respective probability in the mixed strategy profile of that party
in the game Γ . We let l1 = l(P ∗1 ), l2 = l(P ∗2 ) and l3 = l(P¯L). Correspondingly, r1, r2 and
r3 denote the proportion of voters which associate party R with alternative P ∗1 , P ∗2 and P¯R ,
respectively. It is easy to check that for party L, P¯R is a dominated strategy and, for party R,
P¯L is a dominated strategy (dominated by both P ∗1 and P ∗2 ). Thus, in equilibrium (indicated
by superscript (*) on probabilities), l∗1 + l∗2 + l∗3 = 1 and r∗1 + r∗2 + r∗3 = 1. One can further
show the following.
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumption A2 holds. Then there exists a unique equilibrium which can
be characterized as follows:
(i) If x1 ≥ 1−3nR/4 ≡ xˆ, then r∗1 = 4x1−3nL2x1 ≡ g(x1, nL) > 0, l∗1 =
x1+nR−1
x1
≡ h(x1, nR) >
0, r∗2 = l∗2 = 0, r∗3 > 0, l∗3 > 0.
(ii) If x˜ ≡ 3nL/4 < x1 < xˆ, then r∗1 = g(x1, nL) > 0, r∗2 = 2x1−nL2(1−x1) − 2 +
3nL
2x1
≡ z(x1, nL) >
0, l∗1 = z(1−x1, nR), l∗2 = g(1−x1, nR) > 0, r∗3 = 1− r∗1 − r∗2 > 0, l∗3 = 1− l∗1 − l∗2 > 0.
(iii) If x1 ≤ x˜, then r∗1 = l∗1 = 0, r∗2 = h(1 − x1, nL) > 0, l∗2 = g(1 − x1, nR), r∗3 > 0, l∗3 > 0.
Proof See Appendix B. 
We will now discuss the impact of an increase in the number of partisan voters on the
political equilibrium.15
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumption A2 holds. If x1 > 1/2 (i.e., the majority of middle-
of-the-road voters prefers P¯R to P¯L), parties converge to the median voter’s ideal point if
nR rises and diverge from the median voter if nL rises. If x1 < 1/2, the opposite holds.
Proof First, note that xˆ > 1/2 and x˜ < 1/2, according to part (iii) of Assumption A2. If x1 >
1/2, voters of type 1 are the median voter. Hence, applying Definition 1, parties converge
to the median voter if the proportion of voters that identify both parties with P ∗1 , given by
r∗1 l
∗
1 , rises. According to part (i) of Lemma 1, if x1 ≥ xˆ, then r∗1 l∗1 = g(x1, nL)h(x1, nR).
15We do not consider the knife-edge case x1 = 1/2.
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Fig. 1 Reaction functions and
effect of an increase in nR for the
case wherex1 ≥ xˆ
Clearly, this proportion of voters is increasing in nR and decreasing in nL. If 1/2 < x1 < xˆ,
then r∗1 l∗1 = g(x1, nL)z(1 − x1, nR), according to part (ii) of Lemma 1. Hence, r∗1 l∗1 is again
increasing in nR (note that ∂z(x2, nR)/∂nR > 0 if x1 = 1 − x2 > a = 1/4) and decreasing
in nL. For the case where x1 < 1/2, calculate r∗2 l∗2 by distinguishing the ranges x˜ < x1 <
1/2 and x1 ≤ x˜, using parts (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 1, respectively. The result thus can be
confirmed in an analogous way. This concludes the proof. 
To gain some intuition for the result stated by Proposition 2, suppose first that a large
majority of the middle-of-the-road electorate is of type 1, i.e., x1 ≥ xˆ. In this case, parties
will never propose the preferred policy alternative of the minority of type 2 voters, P ∗2 ,
in equilibrium, i.e., l∗2 = 0 (part (i) of Lemma 1). Now consider an upward shift in nR .
Starting from equilibrium, other things equal, when nR increases, party R would gain from
proposing policy alternative P¯R unambiguously instead of proposing both P ∗1 and P¯R . As
can be observed from Fig. 1, the range of values of l1 (the proportion of voters who identify
party L with alternative P ∗1 ) in which party R finds it optimal to exclusively to play P¯R (that
is, to set r1 = 0) increases. This means that the reaction curve of party R shifts rightward
(dashed line in Fig. 1) as a response to an increase in nR . So as to maintain the equilibrium
platform, it is necessary that party L will increase l∗1 , thus balancing against the upward shift
in nR .
To grasp the intuition for this result, one can decompose the effect of a rise in the number
of party R’s diehards into a direct effect and a strategic one. The direct effect derives from
the fact that an increase in nR , other things equal, would induce party R to shift its policy
to the right (that is, to diverge from the center). To see the strategic effect, recall that type
1 voters are more inclined to the ideal point of rightwing partisans, P¯R , compared with P¯L
(as u1(P¯R) > u1(P¯L)) and form the majority of the electorate (as x1 > 1/2). Thus, party L,
in response to the rightward shift of party R, would gain from shifting its policy towards
the center, thus converging towards the preferred policy alternative of the majority. In turn,
this behavioral response of party L has a restraining effect on party R which, as a result
of party L’s shift to the center, finds it less profitable to diverge from the median voter. In
equilibrium, this restraining effect turns out to be extreme when x1 ≥ xˆ, as party R does not
change its equilibrium strategy.
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Now, consider the case x1 ∈ (1/2, xˆ). This means that the median voter is still of type 1,
but the majority of type 1 voters is small enough such that some voters identify both parties
with alternative P ∗2 in equilibrium (i.e., l∗2 > 0, r∗2 > 0). Again, an increase in nR implies
that party L will propose P ∗1 more often (i.e., l∗1 increases) balancing against the desire of
party R to move to the right in response to an increase in nR . In this sense, there is still
convergence. The increase in l∗1 is accompanied, however, by an increase in the equilibrium
fraction of time party L announces its partisans’ preferred policy, P¯L (i.e., l∗3 goes up). That
is, party L also caters more to partisan voters, but less to the minority of middle-of-the-road
voters (i.e., l∗2 decreases).
Consider next an increase in nL, when x1 > 1/2. Note that in analogy to an upward shift
in nR , the direct effect of a shift in nL would be, other things equal, a leftward shift in party
L’s platform. However, as the majority of middle-of-the-road voters is more inclined to the
ideal point of rightwing partisans, the latter will respond to the leftward shift in party L’s
policy by shifting its policy to the right (reflected by a decrease in r∗1 and an increase in r∗3 ).
This in turn will have a restraining effect on party L, similar to the former case, but now
party R has diverged from the median voter.
To sum up, when the party that would win the support of the majority of middle-of-the-
road voters in the case where both parties propose their respective partisans’ ideal points,
P¯L and P¯R , as their platforms (the favored party in a “partisan battle”, which in a simple
sense captures the political bias of the middle-of-the-road constituency) experiences greater
partisanship, the other (non-favored) party tends to moderate its position (i.e., it tends to
announce the median voter’s ideal point with a higher probability) in order to remain politi-
cally competitive. This in turn moderates the incentive for the favored party to announce the
ideal point of its partisans, leading all-in-all to convergence. However, when the party which
would lose a partisan battle (the non-favored party) experiences an increase in the number of
partisans, the other party would tend to move more to the extreme, resulting in divergence.
5.2 Normative analysis
We now turn to the normative implications of our previous comparative-static (positive)
analysis. We aim to show that the median voter actually may benefit from increased parti-
sanship. For this purpose, one generally has to determine what the implemented policies are.
As parties choose to send ambiguous messages (playing mixed strategies) there is no clear-
cut answer to this question. However, dwelling on Laslier’s (2000) interpretation of mixed
strategies, one can invoke a simple ex-ante welfare measure for the well-being of the median
voter. Recall that by assumption each voter observes a single pair of proposals (PL,PR), one
from each party, which is randomly and independently drawn from the joint distribution of
proposals (the pair of ambiguous platforms). Each such voter, assuming naively that all vot-
ers observe the same pair of policies, conjectures that the implemented policy will be the
one (of the two observed) supported by the majority of the voters (assuming a majority vot-
ing rule). Aggregating over voters according to the probabilities assigned to different pairs
of proposals by the mixed strategy profiles, we can calculate the (ex-ante) average utility
gained by the members of the median voter constituency.
Now consider the specific environment defined by Assumption A2 for the range x1 ≥ xˆ.
Recall from part (i) of Lemma 1 that both parties mix between P ∗1 and their partisans’
ideal points only when x1 ≥ xˆ (i.e., r∗2 = l∗2 = 0). Since x1 ≥ xˆ implies x1 > 1/2, as the
political outcome is determined by majority rule, it is easy to see from Table 1 that voters
will believe that the implemented policy will be P ∗1 unless they observe the pair of platforms
that coincide with the two parties respective partisans’ bliss points. The fraction of voters
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that observe the latter pair of platforms is given by r∗3 l∗3 = (1 − r∗1 )(1 − l∗1 ). These voters
believe that the implemented policy will be either P¯R or P¯L, depending on the parametric
assumptions. As the argument we make applies to both cases, let us assume for concreteness
that nR ≥ nL, thus as x1 > 1/2, the implemented policy will be P¯R . Hence, according to part
(i) of Lemma 1, the (ex-ante) average utility of the type-1 voter (who is the median voter, in
this case) is given by
E(u1) = r∗3 l∗3u1(P¯R) + (1 − r∗3 l∗3 )u1(P ∗1 )
= u1(P ∗1 ) − [1 − g(x1, nL)][1 − h(x1, nR)][u1(P ∗1 ) − u1(P¯R)]. (8)
Recalling that ∂h(x1, nR)/∂nR > 0 and observing u1(P ∗1 ) > u1(P¯R) shows that the average
utility of the median voter increases if the number of rightwing partisans, nR , increases.16
By the same token, it is easy to see that when Assumption A2 and x1 ≤ x˜ hold (i.e., the
median voter is of type 2), then an increase in nL raises average utility of type 2 voters,
E(u2).
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we introduced a simple two-party political setting and examined the impact of
stronger partisanship on the degree of divergence of policy platforms from the policy pre-
ferred by the median voter. Parties are assumed to be pure vote-maximizers, and as shown,
need to balance between catering to the median voter on the one hand and obtaining the sup-
port of partisans on the other hand. Voters decide according to the policy alternatives they
observe. Parties may choose to send ambiguous messages to voters, in the case of which
different voters observe different platforms and, therefore, form different perceptions about
the implemented policy in the aftermath of the elections. We show that when the middle-of-
the-road electorate is sufficiently divided with respect to its preferred policy, in equilibrium,
parties indeed choose to send ambiguous messages and the median voter theorem fails to
hold. Our analysis suggests that in this case, somewhat surprisingly, an increase in the num-
ber of partisans may lead to platform convergence in the sense of an increase in the fraction
of voters who identify both parties with the policy alternative preferred by the median voter.
In turn, this behavioral response may benefit the median voter. This holds true under two
conditions. First, to begin with, the electorate is sufficiently divided such that full conver-
gence does not occur (as plausible) and, second, the majority of the non-partisan voters is
more inclined to the party that benefits from stronger partisanship. In such a case, our model
predicts that the other party will become more moderate. It would be interesting for future
research to examine whether this theoretical possibility is supported empirically.
Two final remarks are in order. First, the result that the favored party may not become
more extreme is somewhat reminiscent of the intuitions underlying equilibria in spatial mod-
els with fixed valence advantages for one candidate, e.g., due to incumbency (Groseclose
2001; Aragones and Palfrey 2002). Considering a probalistic voting model in which candi-
dates are politically motivated, Groseclose (2001) shows that there are two conflicting forces
when the valence advantages for one candidate increases. First, the favored candidate wants
to go in the direction of his/her preferred policy; ceteris paribus, this would lead to diver-
gence across candidates’ platforms. Second, moving towards the rival increases the chances
16In fact, all non-partisan voters may gain from greater partisanship. For instance, this is the case when x1 ≥ xˆ
and nR rises.
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of winning. For instance, if both candidates offer the same policy, the candidate with the
valence advantage wins with certainty. The second incentive, associated with the egorent
derived from winning the election, may potentially dominate the first one, which is associ-
ated with the candidate’s political agenda. In contrast to our result, however, this combined
effect typically leads to divergence. The reason is that the non-favored candidate has an in-
centive to move away from the median voter, to de-emphasize his/her valence disadvantage.
What our paper shares with the relevant literature is the general lesson that strategic con-
siderations may bear surprising implications for the behavior of parties and candidates in
response to some advantage they may possess.
Second, our analysis also relates to the debate on campaign finance policy (see, e.g., Prat
2002; Coate 2004; Ashworth 2006). The literature emphasizes a trade-off between the ben-
eficial role of campaign contributions in providing voters with information regarding candi-
dates’ pertinent attributes (such as positions and/or competence) and its distortion of policy
away from the median voter’s ideal. Banning contributions is warranted when the costs of
policy distortion exceed the losses in terms of information, and vice versa.17 Interpreting the
seemingly ideological component in the parties’ objective as driven by contributions com-
ing from special interest groups, our analysis suggests that even when information gains
are absent (or small), banning contributions may be undesirable for the median voter due to
strategic considerations.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
The result is proven in five steps. Steps 1–4 characterize the equilibrium of game Γ when
the policy space P would be given by the interval [P¯L, P¯R] ⊂ R rather than by a grid. Step
5 then shows that there exists a sufficiently fine grid which preserves the claims in step 1–4
and ensures that there always exists an equilibrium.
Step 1. In the first step, we show that, when the policy space is continuous, strategy pairs
other than Pj = P¯j for j = L,R or PL = PR ∈ {P ∗1 ,P ∗2 } cannot be Nash equilibria in pure
strategies of game Γ .
To confirm this claim, first consider the behavior of party L in response to PR ∈ (P ∗1 , P¯R].
Note that it may be optimal to set PL = P¯L (e.g., when nL is high). Also note that, if xi >
0, setting PL slightly above P mini (PR) is always preferred to PL = P mini (PR), i = 1,2. To
see the latter, note that choosing PL slightly above P mini (PR) attracts at least a mass xi
of middle-of-the-road voters, whereas setting PL = P mini (PR) attracts only 0.5xi of type i
voters, according to (4). The utility loss from the ideology motive when deviating slightly
from P mini (PR), however, is marginal (by continuity of FL(·)). But since policy space P
is continuous, if choosing PL slightly above P mini (PR) yields a higher payoff for party L
than when choosing P¯L, then there does not exist a best response to PR ∈ (P ∗1 , P¯R]. By
an analogous argument, if PR ∈ [P¯L,P ∗2 ), then PR = P¯R is the only candidate for a best
response of party R. This implies that Pj = P¯j , j = L,R, may be an equilibrium, but no
17For recent empirical evidence on the role of campaign finance and contribution limits in shaping political
outcomes, see e.g., Stratmann (2005, 2006), Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo (2006), Houser and Stratmann
(2008).
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strategy pair such that PR ∈ (P ∗1 , P¯R) or PR ∈ (P¯L,P ∗2 ). Second, if PR = P ∗1 , the optimal
response of party L may be P ∗1 or P¯L. Given PL = P¯L, we have already seen that PR = P¯R
is the only candidate for a best response of party R. Also note that by a similar argument
as used above, setting PL slightly above P min2 (P ∗1 ) is always preferred to PL = P min2 (P ∗1 )
if x2 > 0. (If x2 = 0, party L cannot gain from deviating from P ∗1 or P¯L, respectively, in
response to PR = P ∗1 .) Thus, if PR = P ∗1 , then no other strategy than PL = P ∗1 can be part
of an equilibrium. The same holds vice versa. Similarly, if PR = P ∗2 , then no other strategy
than PL = P ∗2 can be part of an equilibrium, and vice versa. This concludes step 1.
Step 2. In the second step we show that in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of game Γ
such that PL = PR = P ∗i , Assumption A1 and xi > 0.5, i = 1,2, must hold.
To see this, we first show that in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium with PL = PR = P ∗i ,
we have xi > 0.5, i = 1,2. For instance, suppose to the contrary that PL = PR = P ∗1 is
an equilibrium and x1 ≤ 0.5. Now consider a deviation of party L to PL ∈ (P ∗2 ,P ∗1 ). In
this case, party L would gain a mass x2 − 0.5 = 0.5 − x1 of middle-of-the-road voters, in
addition to a utility gain from the ideology motive. Thus, if x1 ≤ 0.5, both parties setting
P ∗1 cannot form an equilibrium. Analogously, PL = PR = P ∗2 cannot be an equilibrium if
x2 = 1 − x1 ≤ 0.5. Next, suppose again that PL = PR = P ∗1 . If party R deviates by moving
to P¯R , it gains nR −([1−FR(P¯R −P ∗1 )]nR +0.5). Thus, if FR(P¯R −P ∗1 )nR > 0.5 it would be
profitable to do so. Analogously, if party L moves to P¯L, it at least gains nL − ([1−FL(P ∗1 −
P¯L)]nL + 0.5). Thus, conditions FR(P¯R − P ∗1 )nR ≤ 0.5 and FL(P ∗1 − P¯L)nL ≤ 0.5 are both
necessary for PL = PR = P ∗1 to be an equilibrium. In an analogous way, it is easy to see that
both FR(P¯R − P ∗2 )nR ≤ 0.5 and FL(P ∗2 − P¯L)nL ≤ 0.5 are necessary for PL = PR = P ∗2 to
be an equilibrium. In sum, Assumption A1 must hold. This concludes step 2.
Step 3. We next show that, given x1, any Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is unique.
To confirm this claim, first, recall from Step 1 that Pj = P¯j for j = L,R and PL = PR ∈
{P ∗1 ,P ∗2 } are the only candidates for Nash equilibria in pure strategies. The claim in step 3
is proven by distinguishing all possible scenarios regarding the relationship of voters’ utility
at different policies P ∈ {P¯L, P¯R}.
Scenario 1: First, suppose that type 1 individuals are strictly better off under platform P¯R
than under P¯L and type 2 voters are strictly better off under platform P¯L than under P¯R ; that
is,
u1(P¯L) < u1(P¯R) and u2(P¯L) > u2(P¯R). (A.1)
Then both P min1 (P¯R) > P¯L = P min2 (P¯R) and P max2 (P¯L) < P¯R = P max1 (P¯L) hold. Now sup-
pose PL = P¯L and PR = P¯R . Then party L attracts a fraction x2 = 1 − x1 of the elec-
torate, whereas party R attracts the remaining fraction x1. Now, for instance, if party L
deviates by proposing a platform slightly above P min1 (P¯R) (given PR = P¯R) it attracts all
middle-of-the-road voters. Thus, P¯L is the (unique) optimal response to P¯R if and only if
nL + x2 ≥ [1 −FL(P min1 (P¯R)− P¯L)]nL + 1, which is equivalent to FL(P min1 (P¯R)− P¯L)nL ≥
1 − x2 = x1. Similarly, for party R, P¯R is the (unique) optimal response to P¯L if and only if
FR(P¯R − P max2 (P¯L))nR ≥ 1 − x1 = x2. Now note that P min1 (P¯R) < P ∗1 and P max2 (P¯L) > P ∗2 .
Thus, if PL = PR = P ∗1 is a Nash equilibrium, i.e., x1 > 0.5 and FL(P ∗1 − P¯L)nL ≤ 0.5,
according to step 2, it is impossible that FL(P min1 (P¯R) − P¯L)nL ≥ x1 > 0.5 holds at the
same time. Similarly, if PL = PR = P ∗2 in Nash equilibrium (such that x2 > 0.5 and
FR(P¯R − P ∗2 )nR ≤ 0.5, according to step 2) it is impossible that FR(P¯R − P max2 (P¯L))nR ≥
x2 > 0.5 holds at the same time. However, if Pj = P¯j for j = L,R is a Nash equilibrium
for some x1, then either FL(P min1 (P¯R) − P¯L)nL ≥ 0.5 or FR(P¯R − P max2 (P¯L))nR ≥ 0.5 must
hold, with strict inequality if x1 	= 0.5. Thus, for any x1 such that Pj = P¯j for j = L,R is a
Nash equilibrium, at least one necessary condition for PL = PR = P ∗i to be an equilibrium
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is violated, i = 1,2. One can show that analogous arguments apply if u1(P¯L) > u1(P¯R) and
u2(P¯L) < u2(P¯R).
Scenario 2: Next suppose ui(P¯L) < ui(P¯R) for i = 1,2. That is, if PL = P¯L and PR = P¯R ,
then party L gets payoff nL, whereas party R gets nR + 1. (Again, the following argu-
ments apply in a similar way to the opposite case in which ui(P¯L) > ui(P¯R) for i = 1,2.)
Now, given PR = P¯R , party L can attract at least a mass xi of middle-of-the-road voters
by choosing PL slightly above P mini (P¯R). Thus, for PL = P¯L being the optimal response
to PR = P¯R , it is necessary that nL ≥ [1 − FL(P mini (P¯R) − P¯L)]nL + xi for i = 1,2. That
is, FL(P min1 (P¯R) − P¯L)nL ≥ x1 and FL(P min2 (P¯R) − P¯L)nL ≥ 1 − x1 must hold simultane-
ously. Now note that P min1 (P¯R) < P ∗1 and P min2 (P¯R) < P ∗2 . Thus, if Assumption A1 holds
and PL = PR = P ∗i is a Nash equilibrium for some xi(> 0.5), i = 1,2, it is impossible that
Pj = P¯j for j = L,R is a Nash equilibrium at the same time. Vice versa, if Pj = P¯j for
j = L,R is a Nash equilibrium for some x1, then either FL(P min1 (P¯R) − P¯L)nL ≥ 0.5 or
FL(P
min
2 (P¯L) − P¯L)nL ≥ 0.5 must hold, with strict inequality if x1 	= 0.5. Thus, for any x1
such that Pj = P¯j for j = L,R is a Nash equilibrium, at least one necessary condition for
PL = PR = P ∗i to be an equilibrium is violated, i = 1,2, according to step 2.
Scenario 3: Finally, consider the case in which ui(P¯L) = ui(P¯R) for at least one i = 1,2.
In this case, given PR = P¯R , a slight deviation of party L from P¯L yields a gain of at least
a mass 0.5xi of voters, whereas the loss of partisan votes is marginal by continuity of FL.
Thus, if u(P¯L, Si) = u(P¯R, Si) for all i = 1,2, the strategy pair Pj = P¯j , j = L,R, cannot
be an equilibrium. If, say, u1(P¯L) = u1(P¯R) and u2(P¯L) < u2(P¯R), for P¯L being the opti-
mal response to PR = P¯R , it is necessary that both x1 = 0 and FL(P min2 (P¯R) − P¯L)nL ≥
1 − 0.5x1 simultaneously hold. Thus, x1 = 0 and FL(P min2 (P¯R) − P¯L)nL ≥ 1 must hold. In
this case, however, neither PL = PR = P ∗1 nor PL = PR = P ∗2 can be a Nash equilibrium,
since necessary condition x1 > 0.5 is violated for the former and FL(P ∗2 − P¯L)nL ≤ 0.5 is
violated for the latter (recall P ∗2 > P min2 (P¯R)). Similar arguments hold whenever ui(P¯L) =
ui(P¯R) for one i = 1,2. This concludes step 3.
Step 4. Next, we show that when the policy space is continuous and Assump-
tion A1 holds, then PL = PR = P ∗1 is a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
of game Γ if x1 ≥ x¯(nL, P¯L,P ∗1 ), PL = PR = P ∗2 is a unique Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies if x1 ≤ x(nR, P¯R,P ∗2 ), and no pure-strategy equilibrium exists if x1 ∈
(x(nR, P¯R,P
∗
2 ), x¯(nL, P¯L,P
∗
1 )).
To confirm this claim, first, suppose PL = PR = P ∗1 and x1 > 0.5. (Recall from step 2 that
x1 > 0.5 is necessary for PL = PR = P ∗1 to be an equilibrium.) For party R, any deviation
to the left of P ∗1 is not beneficial because it deviates further from its ideal point and loses
(at least) a mass 0.5 − x2 = x1 − 0.5 > 0 of voters. Similarly, any deviation of party L
to the right of P ∗1 is not beneficial. Now let us consider three other possible scenarios for
deviating behavior from PL = PR = P ∗1 , starting with party R. If party R moves to the right
of P ∗1 , it loses all voters, i.e., the best is to go to P¯R . We already know from the proof of
step 2 that this does not pay if FR(P¯R − P ∗1 )nR < 0.5, which is implied by presumption
FR(P¯R − P ∗2 )nR ≤ 0.5 since P ∗2 < P ∗1 . Now, we turn to party L. Consider first a deviation
of party L to the left of P min2 (P ∗1 ). (Note that P min2 (P ∗1 ) < P ∗1 .) Since this implies a loss of
all middle-of-the-road voters, the best is to go to P¯L. We already know from the proof of
step 2 that this does not raise the payoff of party L if FL(P ∗1 − P¯L)nL ≤ 0.5, as presumed.
Finally, consider the case in which party L deviates to a point PL ∈ (P min2 (P ∗1 ),P ∗1 ). In this
case party L will get support from exactly a mass x2 = 1 − x1 of the middle-of-the-road
electorate. Since the best is to go as far to the left as possible while retaining these voters,
PL is set slightly above P min2 (P ∗1 ). This will not raise the payoff of party L if and only if
0.5 + [1 −FL(P ∗1 − P¯L)]nL ≥ 1 − x1 + [1 −FL(P min2 (P ∗1 )− P¯L)]nL, which is equivalent to
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x1 ≥ x¯(nL, P¯L,P ∗1 ) ∈ (0.5,1). Observing the uniqueness result in step 3, this confirms that,
when the policy space is continuous, PL = PR = P ∗1 is a unique Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies if x1 ≥ x¯ holds.
Next, suppose PL = PR = P ∗2 and x2 > 0.5, i.e., x1 < 0.5. For similar reasons as above,
any deviation of party L to the right of P ∗2 and any deviation of party R to the left of P ∗2
is not profitable. Moreover, analogously to the previous case, it is easy to show that, by
presumption, it does not pay for party L to deviate in any other way. For party R, any
deviation to the right of P max1 (P ∗2 ) is equally unprofitable. (Note that P max1 (P ∗2 ) > P ∗2 .)
Finally, consider the remaining deviation for party R, i.e., PR ∈ (P ∗2 ,P max1 (P ∗2 ).) Set-
ting PR slightly below P max1 (P ∗2 ) does not raise the payoff for party R if and only if
0.5 + [1 − FR(P¯R − P ∗2 )]nR ≥ x1 + [1 − FR(P¯R − P max1 (P ∗2 ))]nR , which is equivalent to
x1 ≤ x(nR, P¯R,P ∗2 ) ∈ (0,0.5). Using step 3, this confirms that, when the policy space is con-
tinuous, PL = PR = P ∗2 is a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies if x1 ≤ x(nR, P¯R,P ∗2 )
holds.
To show that no equilibrium in pure strategies of game Γ exists when x1 ∈ (x, x¯), first,
note that Assumption A1 implies
FL(P
min
1 (P¯R) − P¯L)nL < 0.5 and FR(P¯R − P max2 (P¯L))nR < 0.5 (A.2)
since P min1 (P¯R) < P ∗1 and P max2 (P¯L) > P ∗2 , respectively; moreover,
FL(P
min
2 (P¯R) − P¯L)nL < 0.5 and FR(P¯R − P max1 (P¯L))nR < 0.5 (A.3)
since P min2 (P¯R) < P ∗2 < P ∗1 and P max1 (P¯L) > P ∗1 > P ∗2 , respectively. Now recall from step
1 together with the previous line of reasoning to confirm step 4 that, if x1 ∈ (x, x¯), the
only candidate for a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is Pj = P¯j , j = L,R. Moreover,
recall from the line of reasoning to confirm step 3 that for Pj = P¯j , j = L,R, to be a Nash
equilibrium, FL(P mini (P¯R) − P¯L)nL ≥ 0.5 or FR(P¯R − P maxi (P¯L))nR ≥ 0.5 must hold for
at least one i = 1,2. However, it is impossible that these conditions hold if both (A.2) and
(A.3) are fulfilled. This concludes step 4.
Step 5. Note that, according to standard existence theorems of Nash equilibrium, there
exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies of game Γ when the strategy space is finite.
Hence, the final step is to show that the result in step 4 also holds when the policy space is
a sufficiently fine grid rather than continuous.
Consider first the scenario described by part (i) of Proposition 1; that is, when x1 ≥ x¯.
Obviously, any Nash equilibrium in the continuum case is also a Nash equilibrium with a
grid. However, we need to ensure that no other Nash equilibrium than (P ∗1 ,P ∗1 ) exists. For
any pair (PL,PR), we define the following two sets, for party L and R, respectively, that
describe the payoff derived by each party for any possible strategy:
L(PR) ≡ {πL(P,PR) | P ∈ [P¯L, P¯R]}, (A.4a)
R(PL) ≡ {πR(PL,P ) | P ∈ [P¯L, P¯R]}. (A.4b)
(Recall that πj (PL,PR) is the payoff for party j = L,R for a given pair of strategies
(PL,PR).)
Let ¯L(PR) ≡ sup[L(PR)] and ¯R(PL) ≡ sup[R(PL)] denote, correspondingly, the
least upper-bounds associated with the two sets. It is easy to verify using our earlier notation
that the following holds:
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¯L(PR) ∈
{
πL(P¯L,PR),πL(P
min
2 (PR),PR) +
x2
2
,πL(P
min
1 (PR),PR) +
x1
2
}
, (A.5a)
¯R(PL) ∈
{
πR(PL, P¯R),πR(PL,P
max
2 (PL)) +
x2
2
,πR(PL,P
max
1 (PL)) +
x1
2
}
. (A.5b)
Let HL(PL,PR) ≡ ¯L(PR) − πL(PL,PR) and HR(PL,PR) ≡ ¯R(PL) − πR(PL,PR)
denote the upper-bound gains of deviating from PL and PR for party L and R, respec-
tively, and let H¯ (PL,PR) ≡ max[HL(PL,PR),HR(PL,PR)]. We need to show that any
(PL,PR) 	= (P ∗1 ,P ∗1 ) does not form a Nash equilibrium for a sufficiently fine grid. By
construction, H¯ (PL,PR) > 0 for (PL,PR) 	= (P ∗1 ,P ∗1 ). We will separate now between two
cases.
Case 1: Consider first the case in which either H¯ (PL,PR) = HL(PL,PR) and ¯L(PR) =
πL(P¯L,PR), or H¯ (PL,PR) = HR(PL,PR) and ¯R(PL) = πR(PL, P¯R). In such a case, it is
easy to verify, as P¯L and P¯R are part of the grid, that this does not form equilibrium. We turn
next to the other, more complicated case.
Case 2: The other possible scenarios can be described as a union of two sets (defined for
party L and R, respectively). Let  = L ∪ R , where
L(PL,PR) ≡
{
HL(PL,PR)|(PL,PR) 	= (P ∗1 ,P ∗1 )
HL(PL,PR) = H¯ (PL,PR) ∧ ¯L(PR) 	= πL(P¯L,PR)
}
, (A.6a)
R(PL,PR) ≡
{
HR(PL,PR)|(PL,PR) 	= (P ∗1 ,P ∗1 ).
HR(PL,PR) = H¯ (PL,PR) ∧ ¯R(PL) 	= πR(PL, P¯R)
}
. (A.6b)
Denote by  ≡ inf[] the largest lower bound of the set . By construction  ≥ 0. We
turn next to prove that  > 0. Assume by negation that  = 0. This implies that, for any ε >
0, there exists a pair (PL,PR) such that H¯ (PL,PR) ∈  and H¯ (PL,PR) ∈ (0, ε). Consider
an arbitrary small ε > 0, and without loss in generality, let H¯ (PL,PR) = HL(PL,PR) =
ε′ < ε. If ε is small, the gain from deviation necessarily derives from increased turnout of
partisans, thus PL necessarily lies in a small neighborhood to the right of either P min2 (PR)
or P min1 (PR). First, assume the latter, namely, that party L sets its policy slightly above the
point at which type 1 voters are just indifferent between the two parties. Thus, ε′ = [FL(PL−
P¯L)−FL(P min1 (PR)− P¯L)]nL. Denoting by fj (·) the derivative of Fj (·), j = L,R, this can
be rewritten as ε′ = nL
∫ PL
P min1 (PR)
fL(P − P¯L)dP . Hence, ε′ ≥ nL[PL −P min1 (PR)]f minL , where
f minL ≡ minP∈[P¯L,PR ] fL(P ),18 implying χ ≡ PL − P min1 (PR) ≤ ε′/[nLf minL ]. The infimum
distance (from PR) that party R has to shift its policy in order to attract the type 1 voters (of
measure x1) is given by PR − P max1 (PL). This could be either positive or negative. We first
look at the case when PR > P max1 (PL). By substitution PR − P max1 (PL) may be rewritten as
Q(χ) ≡ PR − P max1 (χ + P min1 (PR)). It is easy to verify that Q(0) = 0. Furthermore, Q(·)
is increasing and continuous. Thus, Q(PL −P min1 (PR)) ≤ Q(ε′/[nLf minL ]). By construction,
it follows that HR(PL,PR) ≥ x1 − nR
∫ PR
PR−Q(PL−P min1 (PR))
fR(P¯R − PR)dP . However, using
the fact that Q(PL −P min1 (PR)) ≤ Q(ε′/[nLf minL ]) and defining f maxj ≡ maxP∈[P¯L,PR ] fj (P ),
j = L,R, we obtain
18Note that f min
L
is well defined by the continuity of fL (recall that FL is assumed to be continuously
differentiable).
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ε′ = HL(PL,PR) ≥ HR(PL,PR) ≥ x1 − Q
(
ε′
nLf
min
L
)
nRf
max
R . (A.7)
For ε′ = 0, as Q(0) = 0 and x1 ≥ x¯, this inequality is violated, i.e., HL(PL,PR) <
HR(PL,PR). By virtue of continuity, this holds for sufficiently small ε′ > 0. This establishes
that  > 0 by contradiction. For the case where PR < P max1 (PL) it immediately follows that
by attracting the type 1 voters party R gains from increased turnout of partisans as well.
Thus, HR(PL,PR) > x1 ≥ x¯. The same line of reasoning applies to the case where party L
deviates to a point slightly to the right of P min2 (PR) as x2 is bounded away from zero by
assumption.
Now define di ≡ /max(f maxL nL,f maxR nR) and consider a grid where the distance be-
tween any two adjacent points is lower than di . It follows by construction that for any point
in a grid other than (P ∗1 ,P ∗1 ) at least one of the parties can deviate and profit. Thus, the only
equilibrium is (P ∗1 ,P ∗1 ). We can repeat the same argument for the other two scenarios (de-
scribed by parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 1) and define correspondingly dii and diii . We
further let d = min(di, dii , diii ). Note that d > 0. We conclude that any grid including the
bliss points (P ∗i , i = 1,2) and the end points (P¯L and P¯R), such that the distance between
two adjacent points is lower than d , maintains the results claimed in step 4. This completes
the proof of Proposition 1.
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 1
First, note that restriction nj ∈ (1/2,2/3), j = L,R (part (iii) of Assumption A2) implies
x˜ = 3nL/4 ∈ (3/8,1/2) and xˆ = 1−3nR/4 ∈ (1/2,5/8), i.e., x˜ < 1/2 < x˜. We now start by
proving that the mixed strategy profile of game Γ in part (ii) forms an equilibrium when x1 ∈
(x˜, xˆ) and then establish uniqueness for this range. We will then follow a similar procedure
for parameter ranges x1 ≥ xˆ (part (i)) and x1 ≤ x˜ (part (iii)).
Part (ii): Suppose there exists an equilibrium of game Γ such that both parties mix over
P ∗1 , P
∗
2 and their partisans’ respective ideal point with positive probability. According to
Table 1, in this case (l∗1 , l∗2 ) solve
πR,1(l1, l2, nR, x1) = πR,2(l1, l2, nR, x1) = πR,3(l1, l2, nR, x1), (B.1)
where
πR,1(l1, l2, nR, x1) ≡ l1
(
nR
2
+ 1
2
)
+ l2
(
nR
2
+ x1
)
+ (1 − l1 − l2)
(
nR
2
+ 1 + x1
2
)
, (B.2)
πR,2(l1, l2, nR, x1) ≡ l1
(
nR
4
+ 1 − x1
)
+ l2
(
nR
4
+ 1
2
)
+ (1 − l1 − l2)
(
nR
4
+ 1
)
, (B.3)
πR,3(l1, l2, nR, x1) ≡ l1nR + l2
(
nR + x12
)
+ (1 − l1 − l2)(nR + x1) (B.4)
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are expected payoffs of party R when playing P ∗1 , P ∗2 , P¯R , respectively, given that party L
mixes with l1, l2, l3 = 1 − l1 − l2. Similarly, (r∗1 , r∗2 ) solve
πL,1(r1, r2, nL, x1) = πL,2(r1, r2, nL, x1) = πL,3(r1, r2, nL, x1), (B.5)
where
πL,1(r1, r2, nL, x1) ≡ r1
(
nL
4
+ 1
2
)
+ r2
(
nL
4
+ x1
)
+ (1 − r1 − r2)
(
nL
4
+ 1
)
, (B.6)
πL,2(r1, r2, nL, x1) ≡ r1
(
nL
2
+ 1 − x1
)
+ r2
(
nL
2
+ 1
2
)
+ (1 − r1 − r2)
(
nL
2
+ 1 − x1
2
)
, (B.7)
πL,3(r1, r2, nL, x1) ≡ r1
(
nL + 1 − x12
)
+ r2nL + (1 − r1 − r2)(nL + 1 − x1) (B.8)
are expected payoffs of party L when playing P ∗1 , P ∗2 , P¯L, respectively, given that party
R mixes with r1, r2, r3 = 1 − r1 − r2. It is straightforward to show that r1 = g(x1, nL),
r2 = z(x1, nL) solve (B.5) and l1 = z(1 − x1, nR), l2 = g(1 − x1, nR) solve (B.1). To see that
this indeed forms an equilibrium if x1 ∈ (x˜, xˆ), note first that g(x1, nL) > 0 iff x1 > x˜ and
g(1 − x1, nR) > 0 iff x1 < xˆ. Thus, r1 > 0 and l2 > 0. Moreover, note that z(x1, nL) > 0 for
nL ∈ (1/2,2/3) if
z˜(x, n) ≡ 6x2 − 4x − 4xn + 3n > 0 (B.9)
for n ∈ (1/2,2/3). Since x = (1 + n)/3 minimizes z˜(x, n) and z˜((1 + n)/3, n) =
(2n − 1)(2 − n) > 0, we indeed have z˜(x, n) > 0 for n ∈ (1/2,2/3). Analogously,
z(1 − x1, nR) = z(x2, nR) > 0 for all x2 = 1 − x1 when nR ∈ (1/2,2/3), as presumed by
part (iii) of Assumption A2. Thus, also r2 > 0 and l1 > 0. Finally, note that
r1 + r2 = g(x1, nL) + z(x1, nL) = 2x1 − nL2(1 − x1) < 1 if x1 <
1
2
+ nL
4
≡ x, (B.10)
l1 + l2 = z(1 − x1, nR) + g(1 − x1, nR) = 2(1 − x1) − nR2x1 < 1
if x1 >
1
2
− nR
4
≡ x. (B.11)
Since x ∈ (5/8,2/3) and x ∈ (1/3,3/8), according to part (iii) of Assumption A2, we have
xˆ < x and x˜ > x. Hence, also r1 + r2 < 1 and l1 + l2 < 1. This confirms that part (ii) of
Lemma 1 characterizes an equilibrium.
To confirm that this equilibrium is unique, it remains to be shown that no equilibrium
exists in which party L mixes between two policies in the set {P ∗1 ,P ∗2 , P¯L} with positive
probability and assigns zero probability to the remaining policy and party R assigns positive
probability to two policies within the set {P ∗1 ,P ∗2 , P¯R} and zero probability to the remaining
policy. In such a situation, we could have the scenarios: (I) l1 = r1 = 0, (II) l1 = r2 = 0,
(III) l1 = r3 = 0, (IV) l2 = r1 = 0, (V) l2 = r2 = 0, (VI) l2 = r3 = 0, (VII) l3 = r1 = 0,
(VIII) l3 = r2 = 0 or (IX) l3 = r3 = 0. In the following, we will show that none of these nine
scenarios can hold in equilibrium when x1 ∈ (x˜, xˆ).
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• First, suppose l2 = 0. Thus, πR,2 = −l1x1 +nR/4+1 and πR,3 = nR +x1 − l1x1, according
to (B.3) and (B.4), respectively. This implies that πR,2 > πR,3 if x1 < xˆ, which holds by
presumption. Hence, if l2 = 0 in equilibrium, then also r2 > 0, r3 = 0 and thus r1 > 0 in
equilibrium. This rules out scenarios (IV) or (V) to hold in equilibrium.
• Next suppose r1 = 0. Thus, πL,1 = r2x1 + nL/4 + 1 − r2 and πL,3 = nL + 1 − x1 +
r2x1 − r2, according to (B.6) and (B.8), respectively. This implies that πL,1 > πL,3 if
x1 > x˜, as presumed. Hence, if r1 = 0 in equilibrium, then also l1 > 0, l3 = 0 and thus
l2 > 0 in equilibrium. This rules out scenario (I) to hold in equilibrium (and, once again,
scenario (IV)).
• Suppose now l3 = 1 − l1 − l2 = 0. Thus, πR,1 = l1/2 + nR/2 + x1 − l1x1 and πR,2 =
l1/2 − l1x1 + nR/4 + 1/2, according to (B.2) and (B.3), respectively. This implies that
πR,1 > πR,2 if x1 > 1/2 − nR/4 = x, which holds by presumption since x˜ > x. Thus, if
l3 = 0 in equilibrium, then also r1 > 0, r2 = 0 and thus r3 > 0 in equilibrium. This rules
out scenarios (VII) or (IX) to hold in equilibrium.
• Suppose r3 = 1 − r1 − r2 = 0 next. Thus, πL,1 = r1/2 + nL/4 + x1 − r1x1 and πL,2 =
r1/2 + nL/2 + 1/2 − r1x1, according to (B.6) and (B.7), respectively. This implies that
πL,1 > πL,2 if x1 > x, which as we know holds by presumption x1 > x˜. Hence, if r3 = 0
in equilibrium, then also l1 > 0, l2 = 0 and thus l3 > 0 in equilibrium. This rules out
scenarios (III) and (IX) to hold in equilibrium.
• Now suppose r2 = 0. Thus, πL,1 = −r1/2 + nL/4 + 1, πL,2 = nL/2 + 1 − x1/2 − r1x1/2
and πL,3 = nL + 1 − x1 − r1/2 + r1x1/2.
– First suppose l1 = r2 = 0 in equilibrium (scenario (II)). That is, party L must be in-
different between P ∗2 and P¯L in equilibrium, i.e., πL,2 = πL,3, which implies r1 =
(x1 −nL)/(2x1 −1). By supposing that l1 = 0 in equilibrium, we must have πL,1 ≤ πL,2
if r1 = (x1 − nL)/(2x1 − 1). Since πL,1 ≤ πL,2 implies x1 − nL/2 ≤ r1(1 − x1), when
r1 = (x1 − nL)/(2x1 − 1), this condition is equivalent to z˜(x1, nL) ≤ 0. However, we
have already confirmed that z˜(x1, nL) > 0. Hence, scenario (II) cannot hold in equilib-
rium.
– Next suppose l3 = r2 = 0 in equilibrium (scenario (VIII)). That is, πL,1 = πL,2, which
implies
r1 = (x1 − nL/2)/(1 − x1). By supposing that l3 = 0 in equilibrium, we must have
πL,3 ≤ πL,2 if r1 = (x1 − nL/2)/(1 − x1). Since πL,3 ≤ πL,2 implies r1(2x1 − 1) ≤
x1 − nL, when r1 = (x1 − nL)/(2x1 − 1), this condition is again equivalent to
z˜(x1, nL) ≤ 0. But since z˜(x1, nL) > 0, scenario (VIII) cannot hold in equilibrium.
• It remains to be shown that l2 = r3 = 0 cannot hold in equilibrium (scenario (VI)). Sup-
pose the contrary. Thus, we must have πL,2 ≤ πL,1 = πL,3 when r3 = 0. From (B.6) and
(B.8), it is easy to see that, when r3 = 0, we have πL,1 = πL,3 if r1x1 = 2(x1 − 3nL/4)
and πL,2 ≤ πL,3 if r1x1 ≤ 1 − nL. Thus, if πL,2 ≤ πL,1 = πL,3 when r3 = 0, then
x1 ≥ 1/2 + nL/4 = x. But since x1 < xˆ by presumption and we know xˆ < x, this is
impossible. This also rules out scenario (VI) to hold in equilibrium.
Hence, the equilibrium in part (ii) is unique.
Part (i): Now consider the case x1 ≥ 1 − 3nR/4 = xˆ. To prove existence of the
equilibrium in part (i), first note that πR,1(l1,0, nR, x1) = πR,3(l1,0, nR, x1) implies l1 =
h(x1, nR) and πL,1(r1,0, nL, x1) = πL,3(r1,0, nL, x1) implies r1 = g(x1, nL). Also note
that h(x1, nR) > 0 if x1 > 1 − nR which holds according to presumption x1 ≥ xˆ. More-
over, h(x1, nR) < 1 if nR < 1 which holds in view of part (iii) of Assumption A2. That
g(x1, nL) > 0 follows immediately from the fact that x1 ≥ xˆ implies x1 > 3nL/4 = x˜
(recall xˆ > x˜). Furthermore, note that g(x1, nL) < 1 if x1 < 3nL/2 which holds since
x1 ≤ b = 3/4 and 3nL/2 > 3/4 (recall nL > 1/2). For existence of equilibrium in which
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both r1 = g(x1, nL) and l1 = h(x1, nR) hold, it remains to be shown that r2 = l2 = 0 are
consistent with an equilibrium under this mixture. To see this, note from Table 1 that for
party R, P ∗2 is dominated by P¯R when x1 ≥ xˆ. Hence, r∗2 = 0 if x1 ≥ xˆ. Moreover, note
that when r2 = 0, πL,1 > πL,2 if x1 − nL/2 > r1(1 − x1). If r1 = g(x1, nL), this condition
becomes z˜(x1, nL) > 0, which we know is true. Hence, indeed l2 = 0 is indeed best response
r1 = g(x1, nL) and r2 = 0.
We now turn to show uniqueness of equilibrium when x1 ≥ xˆ. Since we already know
that r∗1 = g(x1, nL) and r∗2 = 0 in any equilibrium, it remains to be shown that no equilibrium
with l2 > 0 exists. Suppose the contrary, which means that an equilibrium with either l1 = 0
or l3 = 0 exists. However, l1 = 0 cannot hold in equilibrium since we already know from the
uniqueness proof for part (ii) that when r2 = 0, we have πL,1 > πL,2 if πL,2 = πL,3. Similarly,
l3 = 0 cannot hold since we already know that when r2 = 0, πL,3 > πL,2 if πL,1 = πL,2. This
confirms uniqueness of the equilibrium in part (i).
Part (iii): Finally, consider the case x1 ≤ 3nL/4 = x˜. Using x1 = 1 − x2, this implies
x2 ≥ 1 − 3nL/4. The situation is thus symmetric to part (i), as implied by Assumption A2.
The result follows analogously.
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
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